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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 18-1795 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
PAUL MOE,  
 
           Appellant 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-17-cr-00277-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Katherine S. Hayden  
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on March 15, 2019  
 
Before: MCKEE, ROTH and FUENTES, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: April 17, 2020) 
________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Paul Moe was convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud for 
submitting false time sheets to his employer.  Moe’s time sheets stated he had worked 
forty hours per week when, in fact, he had worked far less.  Moe concedes that he was 
not present at his job forty hours per week.  Instead, he argues that his time sheets were 
not materially false because, pursuant to contractual language, he was not actually 
required to fulfill the forty-hour requirement.  For that reason, he contends that the 
District Court should have granted his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the ground 
that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions.  He also objects to the 
District Court’s jury instructions, its failure to exclude evidence regarding his 
extramarital affair, and its failure to strike a portion of the government’s summation.  We 
will affirm the District Court on all grounds.     
I 
Moe worked for APM Terminals, a port and terminal operator, as a General 
Foreman.  Pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between his 
employer and his union, ILA Local 1804-1, which was amended in a 2013 Memorandum 
of Settlement (MOS), Moe qualified as an “Incumbent” and received his compensation in 
the form of a Special Package.  Moe’s Special Package compensated him twenty-four 
hours per day, seven days per week because he was on-call 24/7; the twenty-four hours 
were made up of eight hours of straight time, twelve hours of overtime, and four hours of 
double overtime, resulting in annual compensation in excess of $400,000.  The relevant 
provision of the MOS, for the purposes of this appeal, states that “incumbent” employees 
like Moe: 
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will be assigned specific work tasks by their Employers, will 
be required to be physically present engaged in that work when 
required by their Employers for a minimum of forty 40 hours 
per week, and will be required to report to the terminals when 
required by their Employers.  Employees not present at work 
when required will be subject to docking of pay and 
suspensions for repeated offenses.1 
 
The parties dispute whether Moe was required to be physically present at APM’s 
port for forty hours per week to qualify for his Special Package compensation.  Moe 
contends that the phrase “when required” in the MOS meant that he had to report to work 
only when instructed by his employer.  The government asserts that the MOS, in addition 
to the evidence submitted at trial, establishes that Moe was subject to a requirement of 
being at work for a minimum of forty-hours a week and submitted time sheets he knew to 
be false.  
Moe was indicted on July 19, 2017.  Following a trial, a jury convicted Moe of 
thirteen counts of wire fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1349.  Moe moved for a judgment of acquittal under 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, and the District Court denied the motion.   
II 
We will affirm the District Court’s denial of Moe’s Rule 29 motion because there 
was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to convict Moe.2  We review a sufficiency 
of the evidence challenge de novo and view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
 
1 A62 (emphasis added).  
2 The government argues that Moe waived his argument that the MOS did not require 
him to work forty hours per week.  We do not address this argument because we hold that 
the jury had sufficient evidence to convict Moe of wire fraud.  
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the prosecution.3  Moe carries the burden to show that “no reasonable juror could accept 
evidence as sufficient to support the conclusion of the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”4     
Moe’s primary argument is that, pursuant to the MOS, he only had to report “when 
required” by his employer, and, therefore, he could not have committed fraud because he 
did not make any material misrepresentations on his time sheets, an essential element of 
wire fraud.5  However, the prosecution presented numerous pieces of evidence showing 
that Moe was in fact required to work forty hours per week and that Moe knew he was 
subject to this requirement.  First, the MOS stated that Moe was required to work forty 
hours per week.6  Second, Moe’s supervisor and other Special Package holders testified 
that the forty-hour requirement was mandatory.7  Third, in Moe’s prior testimony, which 
was read to the jury, he said he normally worked “Monday through Friday” and 
sometimes on Saturday and Sunday.8   
At trial, however, after the evidence showed that Moe was not at work anywhere 
close to forty hours per week, he abandoned any argument about how frequently he 
reported to work and rested instead on his supposed interpretation of the MOS.  Based on 
this evidence, we cannot say that no reasonable juror could have concluded that Moe 
 
3 United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 60 (3d Cir. 2008). 
4 United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted). 
5 United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 248 (3d Cir. 2011).   
6 Two other binding agreements—the Master Contract governing union workers and the 
collective bargaining agreement—also included the forty-hour requirement.  See SA1140, 
SA1238-39.  
7 See, e.g., SA368, SA489, SA536.  
8 SA927.  
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knew he was subject to a forty-hour work week requirement and submitted materially 
false time sheets.9   
III 
 Moe’s remaining arguments also fail.  First, Moe contends the jury should have 
been instructed that Moe was entitled to acquittal if they had any reasonable doubt as to 
the government’s interpretation of the forty-hour requirement in the MOS and that they 
were to apply principles of civil contract law in interpreting the MOS.  Moe, however, 
agreed to the jury instructions and, therefore, waived this argument.10   
Second, the District Court did not commit plain error by admitting evidence of 
Moe’s extramarital affair. 11  This established that Moe was hours away from his job site 
with his mistress during typical work hours and thus was unable to report to work “as 
required” by his employer.  This evidence is relevant, particularly because it rebuts 
Moe’s supposed interpretation of the MOS, and its probative value outweighs any 
prejudicial effect.12   
Third, Moe argues that the District Court should have instructed the jury to ignore 
the government’s statements implying that the presence of union leaders in the courtroom 
 
9 Moe also argues that if he is entitled to judgment of acquittal on the charges relating to 
the forty-hour requirement, he should also be granted a new trial on the two counts 
related to his collection of his full compensation while on vacation.  Because we affirm 
on the conviction, we do not address the latter.  
10 United States v. Ozcelik, 527 F.3d 88, 97, n.6 (3d Cir. 2008).  Even if this argument is 
not waived, he cannot show plain error.  See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-
34 (1993).  
11 Plain error review applies because Moe did not object to the evidence at trial.  Olano, 
507 U.S. at 733-34. 
12 United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 295 (3d Cir. 2007).  
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intimidated one of the government’s witnesses into giving inconsistent testimony.  This 
argument also fails because the government made these statements in response to Moe’s 
counsel’s questions to this witness on cross-examination.  After Moe’s counsel directed 
the witness’s attention to the union leaders and reminded him that they were “personal 
friends of Paul Moe,” the witness stated that he did not make an agreement with Moe to 
“break the law” or “steal money from APM.”13  However, on direct examination, just 
moments earlier, the witness had stated that “Moe was taking money he wasn’t entitled 
to.”14  The District Court’s failure to strike the prosecutor’s statements does not constitute 
plain error in light of the invited response doctrine.15 
IV 
 For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
13 SA798-99. 
14 SA794. 
15 United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1985); accord Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 
178, 200 (3d Cir. 2000).  
